Despite investigations by four special committees, key questionsremain about the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant , the world’s worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. The committees, each set up by the government, the Diet, TokyoElectric Power Co. and the private sector, have key differences ininterpretations of events such as if TEPCO planned to abandon thefacility at one point, if critical mistakes were made in coolingoverheating reactors and what actually occurred in the No. 2reactor. So far, the first three committees have released reports but failedto paint a clear and d
According to those individuals in the plant who responded to theaccident, there was no one who had experience operating the ICseither during training exercises or inspections. Workers only hadword-of-mouth information from those who had such experience. The government panel’s interim report pointed out, “That wasextremely inappropriate for an operator of a nuclear power plant.” The TEPCO panel did not find any human error in the handling of thecooling mechanisms. Regarding the ICs for the No.
At a little after 6 a.m. on March 15, a number of workers at theFukushima No. 1 plant heard the sound of a large impact. At 6:18 a.m., during a teleconference with TEPCO headquarters, aplant official said that the sound might have been caused by thebottom of the suppression chamber of the No. 2 reactor falling.
Despite investigations by four special committees, key questionsremain about the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant , the world’s worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. The committees, each set up by the government, the Diet, TokyoElectric Power Co. and the private sector, have key differences ininterpretations of events such as if TEPCO planned to abandon thefacility at one point, if critical mistakes were made in coolingoverheating reactors and what actually occurred in the No. 2reactor.